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Is there a need for consumer policy? To answer the
question I looked at consumer policy and market processes.
Consumer policy
In the early days, policies to strengthen the market did help
the consumer indirectly, or, if directly, on an ad hoc, temporary
basis. Think of rationing in extreme scarcity or quality standards for
dangerous products. From the 1960s onward, however, consumer
policy has aimed at a systematic and direct improvement of the
position of the consumer.
V/hat are the reasons for the change? First, in today's
world consumer sovereignty should not operate. The wish of ihe
consumer is no longer fundamental. Why? Full sovereignty of the
consumer implies a complete servitude of the producer to the
consumer. But the consumer king is capricious. To secure his
capital investments the producer plans production and distribution.
Through all kinds of sales tactics he plays upon the consumer.
Consumer sovereignty becomes an empfy word; the consumer feels
impotent. Second, consumers face a rich, but by its magnitude and
variation, nontransparent market.Information is mainly given by the
producer (Imkamp, 1986, p. 235). The consumer feels
discomforted. l
Consumer policy answers the feelings of impotence and
discomfort. The first reason-lack of consumer sovereignty-leads
to a top-bottom motivation. From basic values or needs,
policymakers deduce aims (Kuhlmann, 1990, p. 60). Consumer,
policy protects the individual rights in the economic context. Taken
after President Kennedy's presidential address of 1962, the rights
are (1) the right to safety, (2) the righr to be informed, (3) rhe righr
to choose, and (4) the right to be heard. Consumer policy tries "to
insure that all consumers obtain what they really want (were they
fully informed), subject to the limitation of their income" (Maynes,
1979, p. 97). The second reason-consumer feelings o
discomfort-leads to a bottom-top motivation. Inductive methodr
show consumer complaints, in aggregated form they give the aimr
of consumer policy. Consumer policy restores the equality in thr
producer-consumer relation.
Of the tools used, some change the behavior of the
producer, others that of the consumer. All try to protect or inforrri
the consumer: to secure that no unreasonable physical and economic
risks befall him. For physical safety, it means bans on dangerou:
products, for less dangerous products, specifying technicat
standards. For economic safety, it means regulation of thr
information content of advertising and of producer writlen conüacts
as well as subsidies for comparative testing, mandatory informative
labelling, and quality certification (Thorelli and Thorelli, 1974, p
2).
The essence of consumer policy is (1) to increase the
efficiency of the consumer's ends-means relation, and (2) if there is
a conflict between ends from an individual or social perspective, to
influence the ends of the consumer (Kuhlmann, 1990, p. 5-6).
Consumer policy implies that the policy-maker knows the
consumers' ends-means relation. He knows the products that are
dangerous and ought to be banned and the minimal safety standards.
He also knows the standard price, quality, and contract, as well as
the relevant characteristics of the product labels and those in
comparative tests.
Market processes
The neoclassical market model gives the theoretical
motivation of consumer policy. The consumer is a maximizer: action
follows from an optimal choice in a given and known ends-means
relation. The relation includes uncertainty that search can reduce.
Because the consumer faces a gap in as well as an overload of
information, consumer policy directs and restricts his choices.
Prices per standard quantity and comparative tests increase the
market transparency and direct choices. Laws limiting interest rates
or prescribing standard contracts restrict choices. In other words,
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consumer policy fosters-for both producer and consumer-the
conditions for perfect competition: full knowledge and homogeneiry
of goods. To restore competition among consumers however, isn't
an explicit goal. It's implicit, as it fosters the conditions for it. As far
as consumer policy goes, consumers should be better protected and
informed, and competition among producers restored.
Next to this well-known market model there is the far less-
known Austrian model. In the Austrian model the consumer and
producer have to find out the ends-means relations, first. They are
more than mere calculators: they are venturing, innovating,
exploring, and searching for new means and ends. The essential
difference between the neoclassical and Austrian model is the idea of
error and the role of error. Contrary to the neoclassical model, elrors
aren't always calculation mistakes caused by inadequate resources or
a faulty institutional structure. There's also the possibility of. entrepreneurial error: opportunities costlessly available are
overlooked. In disequilibrium would-be buyers who have returned
home empfy-handed should learn that it is necessary to outbid other
buyers. Buyers who have paid high prices should discover that they
could have obtained the same goods at lower prices (Kirzner, 1973,
p.14). The problem is to describe an equilibrium as the result of
" the systematic way in which plan revisions are made as a
consequence of the ,disappointment of earlier plans" (Kirzner,
1962, p. 381).
The neoclassical equilibrium model can't describe
endogenous plan revisions; the maximization model isn't fit for the
task to generate systematic changes. It suffers from a discontinuity
in the succession of decisions. Only an exogenous change in the
data, e.g., in preferences, in technology, or in information, can
generate a new decision. A decision the original model can't explain.
Without exogenous change there is no choice-theoretic explanation
why yesterday's plans are replaced by today's.
Endogenous change is possible with the-what Israel
Kirzner, the leading Austrian theorist of competition,
calls-entrepreneurial element in each man: alertness. Alertness is
the propensity of knowing where to look for information: "the
propensity ... toward fresh goals and the discovery off hitherto
unknown resources" (Kirzner , 1973, p. 34); Disequilibrium points
to market ignorance (error). From the ignorance emerge profitable
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opportunities entrepreneurial alertness exploits (Kirzner, 7979, p.
30). Alertness broadens the image of human action; it makes
possible the description of the market as a unified discovery
process. Austrians are interested in competition as a process, not in
the competitive state that results from it. Not the destination, but the
journey is important.
For Austrians the reasons given for consumer policy have
no value. The first one, consumer sovereignty, is irrelevant. The
point is, do consumers err, and do they try to correct them? Which
of course they do. The second, empirical reason is valid in
equilibrium not in the Austrian world of constant change.
Market processes and consumer policy
How does the Austrian model of the market relate to
consumer policy? In other words: What is the impact of consumer
policy upon the perception of consumers and producers of the
available array of opportunities? Consumer policy "may effect what
it is that decision makers discover to be the situation in which they
act" (Kirzner, 1985, p. 94).These are the costs that must be taken
account of. I give four ways in which consumer policy may hamper
discovery (cf. Kirzner, 1985, p. ß7-a\.
The undiscovered discovery process
A consumer problem doesn't necessarily point to
regulation. The ma¡ket is a discovery process; genuine inefficiencies
generate their own correction. But the systematic tendency for
imperfect knowledge to be spontaneously improved upon takes
time.In Austrian economics time is part of the solution.
What are, for example, the market answers to the
information asymmetry between producers and consumers? Of
course sellers, as specialized producers, know more than non-
specialized buyers possibly can; sellers are able to manipulate
consumers. This led Gorge Akerlof to his claim that in equilibrium
on the market for used cars only lemons will be offered by sale
(Akerlof, t970, p. a90). The government's answer is occupational
license or certification. But there are many free market answers to
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surÏogates consumers nformed repeated purchaSE
expenence relatives and neighbors or inferences drawn
from the firm 's length of life consumers are able to check thetrlf
vefac of Suppliers n any manner laissez faire marke
I (¡lrul (; S ty
screenlng servlces pnv ate SETVlces and all forms of
non governmental certifica tion There are also many information reliable the middleman is, the more he can charge. The supplier h¿to be reliable about quantity and quality of the drugs ro rh
middleman, otherwise he will loose business, too. Better qualit
commands a higher price for the supplier and a higher fee for th
middleman. The result is (1) the market will be more coordinare
and the transaction volume higher than otherwise would be the casr
(2) an experience good becomes a search good; and (3) qualit
doesn't deteriorate; there's even a stimulus to increase it.
The unsimulated discovery process
How do policymakers know what prices and qualities t,
set? In the absence of the profit incentive, market opþortunitie
which present themselves in the form of potential profit are unlikel
to be discovered by them. "It is doubtful in the extreme if ideal
such as benevolence or patriotism can be relied upon, in general, t.
enable a potential discoverer to identify his own personal interes
with that of thee discovery of an opportunity for a reallocation o
resources desirable for society" (Kirzner, 1985, p. 33). Th,
discovery process of the market can't be simulated by regulato4
activity.
Because the consumer always gets the profit (the gain il,
utility) himself, it looks as if his alertness is stimulated however the
form of the market. Yet things are more complicated. A consumer in
a regulated market focuses on the efficiency of a given and known
ends-means relation. A consumer in an unregulated market is, next
to the efficiency of the relation, alert to the discovery of
entrepreneurial errors: to expect the unexpected. His alertness is
switched on because there may be something lurking around the
corner. Something he is hopeful or something he is fearft¡l of. But
government regulation of producer decisions takes possible
surprises out of his open-ended universe. A consumer in a regulated
market (the government-takes-care-of-me) is less alert to new ends
and means than is the one in an unregulated market.
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Iower-quality Servlce will be worse off wlth licens lng
such suppliers will not be permitted to practrce The




Even in an-almost legally forced-nonfansparent market
as the illegal dryss market, to give another examplå, transaction
costs are lowered. A drugs supplier faces high selliirg costs. It isn;i
easy for him ro maþe.r..{ing èîforts; there'icertaini! no room for
direct advertising.An* if caught, he has tn" 
"ost, 
oi'i*prisorrÀ"rrt
and income forgone. For the õonsumer, too, there *. ñigh ¡;ñ;
costs. He faces high-search costs, uncertainiy over qualiíy, unáli
defrauded there's no law to protect him. J
In this disequilibrium situation coordination between
buyers and sellers, and transactio¡ volume are tow. rnt 
"piã""uruwill try j9 make 
-a 
profit-as middleman creating an information
market. The middleman offers information:the 
"oñru-., needs andthe supplier_likes publicized. The supplier separa¿;-the market ofgrygr supply f¡om that of selünj. For a'i"é, rr" creares an
rnrormatlon market which lowers the selling costs. Because he is nosupplier, thp middleman himself doesn'tiface the high costs ãi
imprisonment. At the same time, he lowers the search costs for the
consumer. Both supplier and,consumer value the middl.-un; rr"
reduces the transactlõn costs for both of them (cf. Cunz, rqg5,'pp.
93-103).
self-interest ensures that such a market continues to exist.
The middleman will not share his informarion abouï wher"ì; ñt
drugs,with too many people. otherwise the supplier can be sold oui
as. a--buyer arrives. Thè information will bä exclusive. If the
middleman wants to stay in the market he must be reliable noronìy
in the inforrnation on where ro buy but also orr quuiity. The *oiä
æùÈn6--i.þ¡r,.,.4".
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Regulari0n e û.b a pnce ceiling tends to bar entry by
potential new competl tors But doesn 't merelv block the upper
reaches a glven supply and demand curve It also holds back the
discovery.gj ur yet unknown sources and substitutes of supply and
demand (Kirzner, 1?85, p- 143). To stick to the illegai ärugs
market. Think of such 'undiscovered' uses of marijuana as paper,
fuel, building materials, clothing, animal food, and ã protein iource
for humans.
The chance_thaf regulation may discourage, hamper, or
even completely stifle the discovery process of tñe unregulated
market counts for producers as well as-consumers. The con-sumer,
too, discovers new unexpected ends and means. The role of the
producer doesn't always "consist[] in relieving the consumer of
the-,nec.es-sity -to be his own entrepreneur" (Kirzner, 1973, p.136). Advertising, for instance, alerts the consumer of the
availability and even desirability of a good. But it can also be the
other way around. The producer hireÀ a trendwatcher. someone
who looks out for what a trendy consumer discovers. The market in
a compatible economy is_ a two-sided process. rvhen producers
don't compete it is like a planned economy, e.g., corununîsm in the
former soviet union. when consumers don't cõmpete, it is a bit like
the old caste society in India where free entry among different
groups of consumers was absent. when one side of ihe market
process fails the ec-onomy becomes rigid and less competitive.
James Steuart, a predecessor of Adam smith, described thijback in
1767 as double competition. "Double competition is what is
understood to take place in almost every operation of trade; it is this
which preve-nts the excessive rise of prices; it is this which prevents
their excessive fall. v/hile double competition prevails, the balance
is perfect, trade and industry flourish" (Steuart ,t161,p.26$.
e.9., enterprising bribery and comrption of the regulators. Ar
doesn't the poor man's drug, crack, fall under this heading too? B
here again, since the peak of the crack epidemic in 1989, the mark
returned to stability. The ma¡ket regulated itself setting rules ar
transmitting knowledge about the effects and dangers.
Conclusion
The Austrian model of the market gives a novel angle for
critique of the regulated consumer. Regulation interferes with tl
spontaneous discovery process that the unregulated markt
generates. Comparative tests, informative labels, and so on, arer
wrong. It's regulation that makes them wrong; They ought to follo
from the entrepreneurial-competitive process of discover.
Consumer policy ends up with about the opposite of what it intend
Isn't the ultimate aim to better the possibilities to satisfy needs b
means of consumption?
When the French mercantilist minister, Colbert, onc
asked a group of businessmen what he could do for them, one (
them, Legendre, replied, laissez nous faire. As is clear by now, r
isn't only Legendre who had to say no. For when Ralph Nade
asked the government to help him, it would have been equally wis
for her just-to-say-no. What the capitalistic market proceis depend
on is nothing but entrepreneurship. Less consumer policy mean
more entrepreneurship for producer-and consumer alike.
t
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The wholly superfluous discovery process
Regulation is likely to open up nèw roads for
entrepreneurial gain.It introduces a new situatiõn: a new discovery
process with its wholly unexpected and even undesired outcomeé,
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